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Abstract 
 
China’s investments in the European Union are much lower than what you may 
expect given the economic size of both entities. These relatively low investments 
in  Europe  are  a  combination  of  priority  and  obstacles.  The  priority  for 
investments is clearly in Asia, Africa and Latin America. This regional pattern is 
heavily influenced by the need to solve the resource shortage in the medium and 
long term. The investments in Europe and the United States are mostly market 
seeking  investments.  Research  specifically  focused  on  Chinese  M&A  abroad 
comes to the same conclusion. The success rate of Chinese M&A abroad is much 
lower  than  what  we  see  with  respect  to  American  or  European  investments 
abroad. 
In this paper, we examine why Chinese firms are facing more difficulties in the 
European Union than in other regions. The paper focuses on Chinese M&A as 
proxy for total foreign direct investments abroad. By looking at the factors that 
have been documented as influencing the level of M&A abroad, it becomes clear 
that Chinese firms in Europe are hindered by many factors. For example, the 
trade between China and the EU is relatively low, the institutional quality is 
lower compared to the United States, there is less experience with respect to 
Europe  and  relatively  many  deals  relate  to  State  Owned  Enterprises  (SOE) 
which makes the deal sensitive.  
So it is logical that Chinese investments are not very high in Europe. However, 
the research makes clear that the obstacles for Chinese investments in Europe 
are disappearing step by step. In that sense, we expect a strong increase of 
Chinese investments in Europe in the future.  
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1. Introduction 
In the 1990s we saw a strong increase of Chinese export and import flows, 
in combination with a rapid inflow of foreign direct investments. From 2002 
onwards, we witness a new phase in China‟s integration in the world economy: 
the  emergence  of  Chinese  companies  abroad.  Prior  to  the  1980s,  China‟s 
outward Foreign Direct Investments (OFDI) was negligible. After a first wave of 
Chinese companies investing abroad in the early 1990s the process more or less 
stabilised. The momentum took shape in the beginning of the new century. The 
growth  of  Chinese  outward  investments  exploded  during  recent  years.  Even 
during the financial crisis of 2009, China‟s outward direct investments remain 
almost  stable.  According  to  the  country  fact  sheet  of  China from  the  World 
Investment Report (WIR) that is published by the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 2009 and 2010, China‟s total outward 
FDI flows increased strongly between 1990 and 2009 as is shown in figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. Overview of China’s outward FDI flows, millions of US$   
 
Source: UNCTAD 
 
The increase of China‟s outward FDI is partly driven by the strategy of 
the government. As a hybrid between a centrally-planned and market economy, 
the  Chinese  economy  is  still  influenced  by  the  state.  In  2000,  the  Chinese 
government  officially  launched  the  so  called  “Go  Global  Policy”,  which 
encourages domestic enterprises to participate in international capital markets 
and to invest directly overseas. The government has backed the firms‟ overseas 
acquisitions  and  joint  ventures  through  tax  benefits  and  favorable  financing. 
Recently,  China‟s  government  indicated  that  China  would  use  more  of  its 
foreign exchange reserves through the China Investment Corporation to support 
and accelerate overseas expansion and acquisitions by Chinese companies. As a 
consequence, Chinese investors are becoming more visible; also in Europe. 
Figure 2 illustrates the regional spreading of China‟s FDI outflows in the 
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this 5 years period. Latin America, Europe, and North America have absorbed 
relatively less Chinese investments during the 2004-2008 period. However, the 
absolute  value  of  China‟s  FDI  outflows  to  Europe  went  up  from  US$  170 
million in 2004 to almost US$ 1 billion in 2008 (Statistical bulletin of China‟s 
Outward Foreign Direct Investment, 2005 and 2009). As a consequence, The 
Chinese direct investment stock in Europe increased to 5 billion USD in early 
2009.  
 
Figure 2. Regional spreading of China’s FDI outflows (% ) 
 
Source: 2004 &2008 Statistical Bulletin of China's OFDI 
 
Despite the growing media attention on Chinese investments abroad, its 
total overseas acquisition is still very low. Even though we see a strong increase, 
one should keep in mind that growth figures are from a very low basis. The total 
accumulated stock by Chinese entities abroad increased to USD 140 billion in 
2008;  less  than  1%  of  total  foreign  assets  worldwide  (China  Statistical 
Yearbook).   
As  indicated  above,  Chinese  investments  in  Europe  are  still  relatively 
insignificant,  but  the  speed  of  increase  makes  policymakers  and  companies 
nervous. Questions such as, “what is the impact of foreign investments on the 
local economy” and “how should European governments and enterprises react to 
this  trend?”  have  grasped  a  lot  of  attention  and  induced  some  debate.  To 
contribute to this discussion, we focus in this paper on the following question: 
What is the present situation of China's Foreign Direct Investment outflows in 
the European Union, including Central and Eastern Europe? And what may we 
expect in the future? In the empirical part of this paper, we use China‟s overseas 
M&A as proxy for China‟s direct investments abroad. This is a logical choice; 
up to 2008, most of the foreign deals of Chinese companies were M&A deals 
(Rosen and Hanemann, 2009).  190   Haico EBBERS and Jianhong ZHANG  
 
The  structure  of  the  paper  is  as  follows.  In  Chapter  2  we  discuss  the 
characteristics of Chinese investments in Europe. One important factor is the 
role of the Chinese sovereign wealth fund as a relatively new source for outward 
investments. In chapter 3 the focus is on explaining why Chinese investments 
(by using M&A data) are relatively low in Europe. Chapter 4 relates to the future 
developments of Chinese investments in Europe. The final chapter concludes.  
 
2. The characteristics of Chinese investments in the European Union 
Most  of  China‟s  foreign  investments  come  from  the  big  State  Owned 
Enterprises (SOE) looking for resources, markets and knowledge. Another part 
comes from private companies; mostly family businesses that found their way to 
foreign markets. Predominantly motivated by the market (potential), they search 
for knowledge or management skills. Besides the SOEs and private companies, 
there is a third flow of capital moving abroad. This flow does not relate to direct 
investments, but these are the investments in mostly treasury bonds to finance 
the  government  deficit;  mainly  the  US,  but  more  and  more  also  in  Europe. 
China‟s trade surplus with the United States cumulated into an enormous inflow 
of  reserves;  mostly  dollars.  To  counteract  the  pressure  for  a  renminbi 
appreciation the Chinese authorities used these reserves to buy US Treasuries. 
By investing in these government bonds it supported the value of the dollar, and 
kept its export relatively cheap. Mid 2009, China owned more than $800 billion 
in US Treasuries (Prasad 2009), which is almost a quarter of the American total 
outstanding debt. Ferguson (2008) referred to this situation in which the United 
States and China are totally entangled in the field of short term capital flows 
with his term Chimerica.  
 
2.1. An additional source of China’s FDI 
After 2007, we witness a new source of Chinese direct investments. In 
September 2007, China established the China Investment Corporation (CIC); the 
Chinese  Sovereign  Wealth  Fund  (SWF).  In  general,  there  are  two  types  of 
SWFs: financial investors such as the Norwegian fund and strategic investors 
such as the Singaporean fund. Financial investors have no interest in control, 
while the strategic investors are looking for management control. There was a 
doubling of Sovereign Wealth Funds between 2000 and 2009 and their total 
assets was around 4 trillion US$ at the end of 2009. It is clear that this fast 
growth resulted in media attention and political sensitivity.  
CIC started with 200 billion US$. In 2009 it received another 150 billion 
US$ from the Ministry of Finance. The fact that it is a sovereign wealth fund, 
including government ownership and control, makes its investments politically 
sensitive. US and EU policymakers don‟t like the situation that CIC is investing 
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and stated over and over again that the only goal is to achieve high returns on 
their investments. The aim is not to take over control over management. If one 
looks at the investments done by CIC, most of the investments are minority 
shares in a broad variety of companies, ranging from minority shares in Morgan 
Stanley, Blackstone, Noble and Visa cards. There are some majority holdings 
but  the  fund  will  act  as  a  passive  investor  with  no  involvement  in  daily 
management.  It is not only direct control of CIC which received mistrust. Also 
the fact that CIC is helping Chinese companies to invest abroad received some 
attention.   
 
2.2. Regional spreading and modes of entry 
The  main  countries  in  the  EU  for  Chinese  Outbound  Foreign  Direct 
Investment are France, Germany, Italy, Spain, The Netherlands, and the United 
Kingdom (Coppel, 2008). At the same time, China is more and more active in 
Central  and  Eastern  Europe.  Companies  such  as  TCL  (electronics),  CNPC 
(petroleum), Bank of China, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China and the 
automobile companies Chery and Geely found their way to countries such as 
Poland, Bulgaria and Romania.  
As  stated  earlier  in  the  paper,  despite  impressive  growth,  the  absolute 
magnitude of China‟s outward FDI remains small. China‟s outward FDI stock 
accounts for only 1% of the world total in 2008 (UNCTAD 2010). Also, in terms 
of FDI outflow per capita, there is a lot of potential. China has much lower 
outward FDI flows per capita compared to, for example, Russia.  Figure 3 shows 
that FDI per capita in Russia increased from 162 in 2006 to 330 in 2009. This is 
substantial higher than the per capita outward FDI in China that ranges from 16 
(2006) to 36 (2009).  
 
Figure 3. Comparison of outward FDI flows per capita between China and 
Russia, US$      
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Rosen and Hanemann (2009) have pointed out that M&A deals account 
for more than 80% of total Chinese outward FDI in 2007 and 2008. The actual 
data from China Statistical yearbook (2009) also supports this view. As shown in 
figure  4,  during  2007  and  2008,  less  than  1%  of  Chinese  FDI  has  chosen 
Greenfield investment as the mode of entry. Approximately 20% of Chinese FDI 
implements JVs, and the rest has selected M&A as their mode of entry to do 
overseas investments.  
 
Figure 4. China’s total FDI by form, 2007 – 2008  
 
Source: China Statistical yearbook 
 
2.3. The rationales behind Chinese investments in the EU 
The  rationales  behind  Chinese  investments  in  the  European  Union  are 
investigated  by  various  authors.  For  example,  Gattai  (2010)  indicates  that 
Chinese companies are motivated by both “push” and “pull” factors to expand 
their business in the EU. The push factors relates to the economic and political 
environment in China. Examples are the level of overcapacity in certain markets 
and government policy to stimulate outward FDI. Pull factors refer to the host 
country  characteristics  such  as  the  potential  market  and  other  location 
advantages.  Some  research  focuses  on  specific  bilateral  relations.  Burghart 
(2009) focus on Chinese investments in the UK. Nicolas (2010) concentrates on 
Chinese investments in France. The research of Barauskaife (2009) specifically 
looks at the Baltic States. The mentioned research makes clear that access to 
foreign  markets  is  the  overwhelming  driver  behind  China‟s  outflow  of 
investments  to  the  EU  and  that  government  policy  at  home  and  in  the  host 
country is of utmost importance.  
Many studies (Zhang, 2009; Buckley, 2007 among  others) support the 
view that market seeking is an important motive to invest in the EU. Johnson 
(2006) and Areddy (2006) indicate the important linkage between GDP growth 
and flows of FDI. This relationship is in line with the Investment Development 
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FDI  inflow  and  outflow  through  5  stages  of  economic  development.  On  the 
vertical axis the net outward investment (NOI) position is indicated. This NOI is 
the gross outward direct investment stock less the gross inward direct investment 
stock.  A  negative  NOI  means  that  the  inward  FDI  stock  is  larger  than  the 
outward  FDI  stock,  while  a  positive  NOI  indicates  more  outward  stock 
compared  to  inward  FDI  stock.  As  shown  in  figure  5,  China‟s  investment 
development from 1980 to 2009 is following the IDP (the trend line is in red, the 
green line shows the annual NOI flows). China is at stage 3 of the IDP; with 
increasing ownership-advantages for its domestic companies.  
 
Figure 5. Chinese case in the NOI flows over 19 years, millions of US$     
 
Source: WIR annex tables 
 
So in the mainstream research of international business and international 
economics what we see today with respect to Chinese investments in the EU is 
not a-typical; in fact it is in line with what you would expect to happen in an 
emerging market economy such as China.  
Next to GDP, specific government policy, including tax incentives, are 
crucial  for  Chinese  companies to  make  decisions  on  FDI  in  other  countries. 
China‟s “Going Global” policy becomes an important rationale behind China‟s 
FDI towards the European Union. As an evolutionary breakthrough, the “Going 
Global” policy was announced first by the Chinese government in 2000 and 
executed over the following years. As a consequence, the overseas investments 
of  Chinese  companies  increased  dramatically.  Figure  6  shows  the  steady 
evolution of Chinese government policies on Chinese outward investments.  
As  part  of  the  “Going  Global”  project,  foreign  exchange  related 
regulation,  fiscal  and  administrative  obstacles  to  international  investments  in 
China were removed step by step (Sauvant, 2005). The study of the prospects 
and  challenges  for  Chinese  companies  on  the  world  stage  by  IBM/  Fudan 
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Bank of China and the China Development Bank, gave strong fiscal backing, 
like a favourable financing in the form of credit lines and low-interest loans.  
 
Figure 6. Phases of China’s outward FDI policy 
Phase 1: Tight controls 
1979-1983 
 
Restrictive  attitude  toward  OFDI  due  to  ideological  skepticism, 
inexperience,  and  low  foreign  exchange  reserves.  Only  specially 
designated trade corporations could apply for OFDI projects. No regulatory 
framework was existent; firms had to apply for direct, high-level approval 
from the State Council on a case-by-case basis. 
Phase 2: Cautious 
encouragement  
1984-1991 
 
As  global  markets  gained  more  importance,  the  government  gradually 
started  to  encourage  OFDI  projects  that  generated  foreign  technology, 
control over resources, access to overseas markets, and foreign currency. 
The first regulatory framework for OFDI was drafted in 1984-85, allowing 
companies other than trading firms to apply for OFDI projects, However 
foreign exchange reserves were still  at  a low level and only firms that 
earned foreign exchange from overseas activities could qualify for OFDI 
projects. 
Phase 3: Active 
encouragement  
1992-1996 
The post-Tiananmen decision to accelerate economic reforms and global 
integration led to a policy of more active encouragement of OFDI. The goal 
was to increase the competitiveness of Chinese businesses, with a special 
focus on 100 plus state-owned national champions. The foreign exchange 
regime shifted from an "earn-to-use" to a "buy-to-use" policy and the OFDI 
approval procedures were gradually eased and localized. 
Phase4:Steppingback 
1997-1999 
 
Government  tightened  regulatory  processes  for  OFDI  projects  and 
recentralized  foreign  exchange  acquisition  against  the  backdrop  of  the 
Asian  financial  crisis,  which  revealed  that  many  firms  had  used  OFDI 
projects for illegal and speculative transactions, leading to heavy losses of 
state assets and foreign exchange reserves. 
Phase 5: Formulation 
& implementation of 
the "going global" 
policy 
In anticipation of WTO accession and growing competition in domestic 
markets, policymakers returned to their previous stance of encouraging 
OFDI and announced a policy package aiming at supporting Chinese firms 
from various sectors to "go abroad". 
In 2004, the regulatory process was reformed and foreign exchange controls 
were further eased and localized. Central officials and local governments 
begun  to  provide  broad  and  active  political  and  practical  assistance  for 
firms with overseas expansion plans. 
Phase 6: Growing 
political support for 
transnational 
corporations and a 
new push for 
liberalization  
2007-present 
Policymakers' support for outbound FDI further increased both because of 
China's massive foreign exchange reserves (surpassing $1 trillion in 2006) 
and the need to build up competitive transportation corporations to sustain 
a change in China's economic growth model. A new regulatory framework 
implemented in May 2009  further eased and decentralized the approval 
procedures.  New  rules  proposed  by  SAFE  in  the  same  month  will 
significantly ease the foreign exchange management for overseas projects 
and broaden the sources of financing available for outbound investment. 
Source: Rosen, and Hanemann, 2009 
 
At  the  same  time  when  China  executed  its  “Going  out”  policy,  the 
countries  in  the  European  Union,  including  Central  and  Eastern  Europe, 
implemented favourable policy measures to attract FDI from abroad. Countries  CHINESE INVESTMENTS IN THE EU   195 
 
in  CEE  provide  incentives  for  FDI  via  tax-concessions,  tariffs-abolition,  the 
settlement  of  free  economic  zones,  and  the  avoidance  of  double  taxation. 
Furthermore,  investments  in  selected  sectors,  such  as  the  agricultural-related 
products  and  the  businesses  that  implement  new  technologies,  are  given 
preferential incentives like investment allowance or tax credits (Ricupero, 2000; 
Radu, Mitroi, Anghel  et al., 2007). Although most legislation on FDI is generic, 
attracting  more  Chinese  FDI  became  a  priority  for  selected  countries  in  the 
region.  Many  countries,  including  the  Czech  Republic,  Hungary,  Poland, 
Romania, Russia, and Ukraine have signed Bilateral Tax Agreement (BTA) with 
China.  
 
3. Why are Chinese investments low in the EU? 
China's investment in EU only accounts for a small percentage of China's 
total overseas investment; much lower than one would expect given that the EU 
is an important economic power. As indicated in the previous part of the paper, 
an overwhelming share of 80% of Chinese FDI towards the EU can be labelled 
as M&A. Therefore, to find the main obstacles of Chinese FDI‟s in the EU, we 
may use the success of M&A activities as a proxy for total FDI over the period 
until the end of 2008. If we take the Chinese overseas M&A as an example, we 
find that the success rate of Chinese firms in Europe is substantially lower than 
for example in North America (for the definition of success, see footnote 2). As 
a  result  it  is  interesting  to  examine  why  Chinese  firms  are  facing  more 
difficulties in the EU compared to other regions.  
 
3.1. Determinants of success 
According  to  the  data  from  Thomson,  about  half  of  China‟s  overseas 
acquisition attempts have not been completed. The chance of success is much 
lower  than  worldwide  (Zhang  and  Ebbers,  2010).  By  using  a  sample  that 
consists of 1,324 overseas acquisitions attempts by Chinese firms, Zhang and 
Ebbers  (2010)  found  that  different  determinants  influence  the  outcome  of 
China‟s overseas acquisitions, the most important ones being: bilateral economic 
relations, ownership of the  acquirer,  competitiveness  of  the  acquirers,  global 
experience, and  sensitiveness of the industry. All these factors hamper Chinese 
acquisition deals to be successful. Another study (Zhang et al. 2010) found that 
the  institutional  quality  of  host  countries  influences  directly  and  indirectly 
China‟s overseas acquisition. In this study, we use the same dataset to analyze 
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Figure 7 below shows the success rate of China‟s overseas M&A in the 
major  regions.
1  The success rate in Europe is lower than in North America, 
Africa and South America. In particular, the difference from the United States is 
interesting because research indicates that the motives to invest are the same for 
both regions. In order to explain the situation in Europe, we compare the factors 
that have been documented as factors that significantly influence  the success 
rate.  
 
Figure 7. Success rate by regions 1982-2008 
40%
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Source: Authors‟ own calculation based on Thomson data 
 
Based  on  the  results  of  the  two  existing  empirical  studies  mentioned 
above, we choose 7 variables for further analysis: the quality of the institution 
framework, the bilateral trade intensity, the industry characteristics; mainly the 
question if the company is operating in a sensitive sector such as the energy 
sector. The next factors relate to the characteristics of the buyer; being a State 
Owned  Enterprise  or  a  private  acquirer.  The  final  two  variables  are  the 
experience of the Chinese company abroad and the use of an external advisor. 
These  7  factors  have  been  found  as  significant  variables  that  influence  the 
success rate of China‟s overseas M&A. Figure 8 provides the measurement of 
the variables.  
                                                           
1 Success rate is the ratio of number of completed deals to the number of announced deals. This 
study only concerns the acquisitions that have reached the stage of public announcement. The 
deals that were discussed in private and abandoned before being made public are not included in 
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Figure 8. The measurement of the variables 
Variables 
and their 
impacts 
Measures  Source 
1. Institution 
quality (+) 
It is calculated by using seven ICRG political risking measures – 
government stability, socio-economic conditions, investment 
profile, law and order, democratic accountability, prevalence of 
corruption and bureaucratic quality.  The factor analysis is used to 
create the single measure. Higher scores on this measure mean 
higher quality of institutions. 
  
Political 
Risk 
Services 
Group,  
2. Trade 
intensity (+)  ) /( ) (
) /( ) (
w w c c
h h ch ch
ch m x m x
m x m x
TI
 
 

 
x and m denote export and import, c, h and w denote China, host 
country and the world 
IMF DOT 
3. Sensitive 
resource (-) 
Dummy variable with the value of 1 if an acquisition deal is in  
energy and other sensitive industries and 0 if it is not 
Thomson  
4. SOE 
acquirer (-) 
Dummy variable with the value of 1 if an acquirer is state owned 
enterprise and 0 if it is not 
Thomson  
5. Private 
acquirer (+) 
Dummy variable with the value of 1 if an acquirer is a private 
enterprise and 0 if it is not 
Thomson 
6. 
Experience 
(+) 
Dummy variable with the value of 1 if an acquirer has successful 
experience in overseas acquisition, 0 if it is not 
Thomson 
7. Advisor 
(+) 
Dummy variable with the value of 1 if an acquirer hires an 
international advisor, and 0 if it is not. 
Thomson 
Legend 
(+) positive impact on success rate 
(-) negative impact on success rate 
 
3.2. Explaining the results 
Now  that  we  know  the  main  variables  to  explain  successful  foreign 
M&As of Chinese firms, the next step is to find out how the European Union 
differs from the other regions. For this analysis we calculate the mean of the 
variables. For calculating the mean we only used the data of the year in which 
M&A deals were executed. For example, if no M&A deals happened in 2004, 
we left out 2004 in our calculations. If many deals have been executed in 2008, 
this year is relatively important in the calculation of the mean. The result is 
exhibited in figure 9. We analyze the variables as follows. 
1. Institutional framework.  In general, countries with a high qualitative 
institutional  framework  have  low  uncertainty  in  economic  activity,  as 
institutions are developed by societies to create order and reduce uncertainty in 
promoting economic exchange and cooperation (Williamson, 1985; North, 1990, 
1991).  Institutional  quality  has  been  recognized  as  an  important  factor 198   Haico EBBERS and Jianhong ZHANG  
 
influencing the performance of MNEs (North 1990, 1991; Brunetti and Weder 
1998; Buckley et al. 2007; Dikova, et al. 2009). Existing studies have found the 
evidence that host country‟s institution influences the success rate of China‟s 
overseas  M&A  (Zhang  et  al.  2010).  The  figures  in  Table  9  show  that 
institutional quality is lower in Europe (0.901) than in North America (1.2856), 
which may partly explain the lower success rate in Europe compared to North 
America.  
Entering  into  the  EU  is  more  complicated  than  entering  into  other 
countries due to the fact that the EU is, on the one hand, an entity of 27 different 
nation states and, on the other hand, one common market with harmonised rules 
and regulations. Chinese companies have to cater not only for the EU regulations 
but also for every individual country. The EU is a strange animal in the eyes of 
many Chinese firms and officials and consequently, the Chinese investors have 
difficulties to figure out whom they should speak with. This perception about the 
European  Union  can  also  be  seen  in  the  way  Chinese  are  labelling  the 
institutional framework of the EU.  
The table makes clear that the institutional framework in Africa and Latin 
America is relatively low and at the same time the success rate of Chinese M&A 
is  higher  in  these  regions  compared  to  the  EU.  One  argument  for  this 
phenomenon  is  that  Chinese  firms  perform  better  in  countries  with  lower 
institutional quality  than  the  firms  from  developed countries (Buckley  et  al., 
2007). The political and economic needs and better political relation between 
China  and  Africa  could  be  another  explanation  for  the  high  success  rate  in 
Africa. 
2.  Trade  intensity.  The  EU-China  relation  is  not  the  first  priority  of 
China‟s foreign policy. The China-US relation is of much more importance for 
China than the China-EU affairs. We use trade intensity as a proxy of bilateral 
economic relations, which measures the degree to which two countries trade 
more or less intensively with each other than they do with the rest of the world 
given  the  size  of  their  total  trade  (Zhang  and  Ebbers  2002).  The  existing 
empirical studies found that trade intensity is a significant factor influencing the 
success rate of China‟s overseas M&A (Zhang and Ebbers 2010). The higher the 
trade intensity, the higher the success rate is. Figure 9 shows us that the trade 
intensity with Europe (0.422) is much lower than with North America (0.8245), 
Africa  and  South  America  (1.099).  This  implies  that  relatively  low  trade 
intensity hampers Chinese firms to buy European firms successfully. 
3. Chinese companies are facing a negative attitude in the host countries. 
For  example,  there  are  discussions  about  the  influence  of  the  Chinese 
government on some of the Chinese investments abroad. This sensitivity about 
Chinese investments is particularly intense if it concerns investments in sensitive 
sectors and if the Chinese acquirer is a State Owned Enterprise.   CHINESE INVESTMENTS IN THE EU   199 
 
Sensitive sectors. It is commonly recognized that it is relatively difficult to 
buy a firm in a sensitive sector, because of political concerns and perceived 
national  security  threats.  The  consequence  can  be  that  deals  are  blocked  by 
national review agencies. The existing empirical studies indicated in section 3.1 
confirmed this view. Because it is a dummy variable, it can range between 0 and 
1. The higher the score, the more deals are executed in sensitive sectors. Figure 9 
shows  that  the  mean  of  this  “sensitivity”  variable  is  low  in  Europe  (0.270) 
compared to other regions. This implies that deals in sensitive sectors (such as 
oil,  mining,  energy  and  utilities)  are  not  very  important  in  Europe.  On  the 
contrary, resource seeking investment is the prominent motive of investments in 
Africa, South America and Oceania. 
Ownership of acquirers. Research indicates that state owned enterprises 
are being confronted with more challenges than private firms when they acquire 
a firm abroad. Since it is a dummy variable, it can range between 0 and 1. The 
higher the score, the more SOEs are involved. If we focus on Europe and the 
United States, figure 9 indicates that SOEs are more active in Europe (0.286) 
than in North America (0.1624), but that private firms are more active in North 
America (0.3401) than in Europe (0.302). This fact explains partly the lower 
success rate in Europe as compared to North America. 
4.  Compared  with  mature  enterprises  in  developed  countries,  Chinese 
enterprises are still at a preliminary stage of development, facing difficulties 
such as lack of experience of transnational actions and overseas management, 
abilities in risk evaluation and adapting to local customs. These drawbacks are 
more intense on Western markets than in developing countries.  
Experience and use of advisors. The existing studies have confirmed that 
experience  and  the  use  of  international  advisors  are  important  to  make  a 
successful  deal.  We  again  use  a  dummy  ranging  from  0  if  there  was  no 
successful experience before 1 if the company had already a successful M&A. 
By looking at figure 9, we see that Chinese firms are less experienced in Europe 
(0.262) than in other regions.  
 
Figure 9. The mean of the variables in Europe and other regions 
    all  Asia  Europe  North 
America 
Africa  and 
South America  Oceania 
Institution  0.625   0.376   0.901   1.2856   -0.225   1.258  
Trade intensity  3.746   5.596   0.422   0.8245   1.099   0.318  
Sensitive 
resource  0.267   0.143   0.270   0.2995   0.658   0.442  
SOE Acquirer   0.193   0.156   0.286   0.1624   0.356   0.450  
Private acquirer  0.303   0.297   0.302   0.3401   0.192   0.477  
Experience  0.297   0.278   0.262   0.3096   0.411   0.482  
Advisor  0.122   0.103   0.167   0.1269   0.123   0.392  
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This could be an explanation for the low success rate in Europe. In terms 
of the use of advisors (ranging again from 0 to 1), Europe (0.167) is slightly 
higher  than  North  America  (0.1269).  This  may  be  because  of  a  more 
complicated business environment in Europe than in North America. 
Due to these obstacles, the China-EU bilateral investment relation is less 
than what you may expect. But this is the situation today. One may expect a 
dramatic increase of Chinese investments towards the EU; driven by the large 
foreign  exchange  reserves,  the  increase  of  ownership  specific  advantages  of 
Chinese companies and the growing intensity of China - EU “bilateral” trade 
relation.   
 
4. The future of Chinese investments in Europe 
In the previous sections of the paper, we elaborated on the main obstacles 
of Chinese investments in the European Union. In this section, the focus is on 
the question whether the drivers and obstacles behind Chinese investments in 
Europe will continue in the medium term future.  
The utilization rate of China‟s global FDI is low. Between 2003 and 2008 
this utilization rate was on average 30%. (China Statistical yearbook). Zhang and 
Ebbers (2010) focus in their research only on the success rate of Chinese M&A 
abroad. They indicate an average percentage of 50%; again much lower than 
what we see with respect to American or European investments abroad. It is 
clear that the indicated obstacles are reducing Chinese investment strongly in the 
European Union. According to empirical research and the outcome of figure 9, 
the main obstacle of M&A (as proxy for total FDI) in Europe relates to the 
political sensitivity Chinese investments face when investing in Europe, the low 
trade  intensity  and  consequently,  the  low  experience  of  doing  business  in 
Europe.   
 
4.1. Getting to know each other 
Chinese investors are new players in many countries and many countries, 
governments and companies are not used to it and maybe also not ready for it. 
An interesting case was the Chinalco-Rio Tinto case of 2009. Although this is an 
Australian case, there are some important learning points which can be related to 
the EU.  
In February 2009, China's state-owned metals group, Chinalco, announced 
its intention to spend $19.5bn to raise its stake in Australia based Rio Tinto from 
9% to 18%. When the deal was announced, it was hailed by Rio Tinto as the best 
solution its problem of $US40 billion amount of debt. However, the proposal 
faced fierce opposition both from shareholders and regulators in Australia. In the 
end, Rio Tinto decided to denounce the deal and pay a break fee of $195 million 
to  Chinalco.  There  were  two  main  concerns  that  drove  Rio  Tinto  to  reject  CHINESE INVESTMENTS IN THE EU   201 
 
Chinalco's investment. One was political anxiety. Chinalco's status as an entity 
wholly owned by the Chinese Government was the core of the concern. Despite 
the fact that the company is commercially managed, Chinalco is funded by the 
China  Development  bank  in  which  the  China  Investment  Corporation  (the 
Sovereign Wealth Fund of China) is the largest shareholder. Clearly, there is a 
very strong connection between Chinalco and the policymakers in Beijing. Since 
the announcement of the proposed deal, the Australian government has been 
confronting  a  growing  protectionist  clamor  from  trade  unions,  opposition 
politicians and local businesses not to allow a state-owned Chinese company to 
gain control of strategic mining assets. Sections of the military establishment 
were  also  opposed  to  the  Chinalco  deal,  warning  that  it  would  cut  across 
Australia‟s  longstanding  ANZUS  defense  alliance  with  the  US.  The  second 
concern  was  Chinalco‟s  future  role  as  both  shareholder  and  customer.  The 
increase in ownership would also result in a stake in the management team. 
Shareholders of Rio Tinto feared that Chinalco‟s appointment of two directors to 
the Rio Tinto board, could give Chinalco excessive influence over Rio Tinto's 
revenues, future growth and pricing strategies.   
The deal was blocked, but Chinese investors are still coming to Australia. 
In August 2009, PetroChina took over LNG and another state owned enterprise, 
Yanzhou Coal Mining Co, China's third-largest coal producer, completed the 
legal groundwork to take over 100% of the issued share capital in Felix  at a 
price of about $3 billion, ranking it China's biggest takeover of an Australian 
firm. However, the takeovers were possible only under strict conditions. For 
example,  the  Yanzhou  Coal  Mining  deal  was  subject  to  strict  conditions.  In 
order to obtain the official approval regarding the transaction, the company was 
obliged to carry out specific requirements such as the regulation that it should 
operate its Australian mines through Yancoal Australia Pty Limited, which is 
headquartered  and  managed  in  Australia  with  a  predominately  Australian 
management and sales team. Also it had to ensure that Yancoal Australia, and 
any  of  its  operating  subsidiaries,  would  have  at  least  two  directors  whose 
principal  domicile  is  in  Australia,  one  of  whom  would  be  independent  of 
Yanzhou Coal and its related entities. All these conditions are intended to reduce 
possible influence from the Chinese government to a minimum. It shows the 
compromises that the Chinese company has made for the completion of the deal. 
What we can learn from this case is that the Australian government and 
the Chinese company are both learning fast. Both parties sees the advantages of 
the  deal  and  both  made  adjustment  in  order  to  continue  with  investment 
activities. It is also expected that this process of “getting to know each other” 
and “needed adjustments” will increase the utilization ratio in the medium term, 
also in Europe.  
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4.2. Meet your new neighbours 
Since there is a positive relation between GDP growth and FDI flows, 
combined with Dunning‟s eclectic paradigm, more China‟s FDI will go towards 
the European Union and Central and Eastern Europe. The increase of ownership 
specific advantage of Chinese companies is initiated and stimulated by the many 
joint ventures. Step by step Chinese  companies learned from their partners and 
competitive strength is becoming strong enough to compete on foreign markets. 
As Dunning (1993) indicated, this O-advantage is one of the preconditions to 
investment  abroad.  Furthermore,  what  is  happening  in  China  (and  other 
emerging markets), is in line with the Dunning-Narula framework (1996). They 
made clear that countries situated in stage 3 (the emerging markets) witness a 
strong increase in outward direct investments. This will continue in the later 
stage  three  and  early  stage  4.  The  consequence  is  that  bilateral  trade  and 
investment  flows  between  China  and  Europe  will  increase.  The  current  low 
intensity trade will increase and more and more Chinese firms will build up 
experience in doing business in Europe. As a result, we may expect a strong 
increase in Chinese investments in Europe. 
There is also a push factor working during the next coming years. Many 
of China‟s domestic markets witness a dramatic overcapacity. This overcapacity 
is driven by two factors. Firstly, there are too many suppliers due to the fact that 
in most cases local governments are helping companies to stay afloat within 
their borders. As a consequence, no company is leaving the market and more and 
more  foreign  companies  are  entering  this  same  markets.  Secondly,  the 
government stimulated the economy dramatically in 2008 and 2009. Part of the 
stimulus package was focused on domestic consumption. Another part of the 
stimulus  package  was  targeted  at  domestic  investments  in  infrastructure  and 
healthcare. There was also direct income support. As a consequence, domestic 
investments  increased  considerably  which  fuelled  the  already  existing 
overcapacity  on  many  markets.  This  situation  of  overcapacity  will  stimulate 
Chinese companies to invest abroad.   
 
5. Conclusion 
In the previous parts, we elaborated on the main drivers and obstacles 
behind Chinese investments in Europe. Political concerns are and will be the 
main  obstacle  of  Chinese  investment  in  EU.  The  sensitivity  to  government 
related investments from China makes both politicians and public nervous. At 
the same time, the Rio Tinto case makes clear that both parties are learning fast. 
The  Chinese  investor  will  take  the  sensitivity  in  the  host  country  into 
consideration,  while  the  host  countries  authorities  and  public  will  adjust 
relatively  easy  to  the  new  phenomenon  of  Chinese companies  visible  in  the  CHINESE INVESTMENTS IN THE EU   203 
 
domestic economy. The process of meeting your new neighbours always takes 
time.  
Besides the reduction of political obstacles, there is a growing tendency 
among private companies to enter the European Union looking for markets and 
brands. One may expect a strong increase in market driven investments which 
are backed by government support. The growing overcapacity on many Chinese 
markets is related to this. Expectations are that this overcapacity will be the main 
characteristic for many years to come. Step by step, Chinese companies with 
enough  O-advantages  therefore  will  move  abroad.  This  will  result  in  more 
market-seeking investments abroad, including in Europe. 
It  is  a  new  fact  in  today‟s  globalized  world  that  investments  from 
emerging markets are finding their ways to the “West”. It is clear that Chinese 
investments will increase over the next decade and we need to adjust to this new 
situation.  This  adjustment  process  holds  for  policy  makers  as  well  as 
international operating companies.  
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